Animica 7.0.0 introduces FORK_ADDRESS_FREEZE, a forward-only consensus rule active on mainnet from block 42,000.
The 6.0.5 freeze-list was node-local and trivially bypassable: it only stopped the operator’s own nodes from admitting or mining a frozen spend. Taking the seed node offline was enough to drain a labelled address through any other miner. 7.0.0 makes the rule a property of the chain. At or after the height, block import rejects any block containing a non-coinbase transaction whose authoritative sender or recipient is a frozen account.
Design properties, as recorded in core/network_params.py:
- Deterministic. The frozen set is a compiled constant in
execution/migrations/address_freeze_2026.py, identical on every node — never an environment variable or a file. At release it contains a single entry: the already-clawed-back ANM-2026-07 attacker address. No ordinary address is affected. - Writes no state. A rule-violating block is loudly orphaned, never a silent balance fork. There is no environment or shadow valve in the verdict, for split safety.
- Forward-only and grandfathered. Nothing below 42,000 is re-examined.
- Miner pre-gates. The mempool selection and block-template paths check both sender and recipient so an upgraded miner never builds a block its own rule would orphan.
Because this is a reject rule with the shape of a coordinated upgrade, every block producer must run 7.0.0 before the height, or a post-height block they mine that moves frozen funds will be orphaned by upgraded nodes. The P2P parameters hash stays pinned, so 7.0.0 and 6.x nodes keep peering through the runway.
7.0.0 also fixes an RPC authentication spoof: the is-local and admin-allowlist checks now use only the real transport peer and treat any forwarding header (X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1, a spoofed allowlisted IP) as remote — the same class of hole the 6.1.0 wallet.* incident fixed from the other side. Fourteen freeze tests and nine access-policy tests were added; an adversarial verification pass returned GO.